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Background: The Equipping Youth to Help One Another Programme (EQUIP) was 
designed for young offenders to address a developmental delay in moral reasoning, 
distorted cognitions and social skills.  
Materials and Methods:  We undertook a single case series study and piloted an 
adapted version of the EQUIP programme with  three men with intellectual 
disabilities (ID) and four men with a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome, all of whom 
were detained in  a medium-secure forensic unit for people with ID.   Treatment was 
delivered over a 12-week period, and participants took part in four one-hour sessions 
per week.   
Results: The results suggest that treatment was successful at increasing moral 
reasoning ability, reducing distorted cognitions and improving ability to choose 
effective solutions to problems.  However, treatment did not have a significant effect 
upon anger.     
Conclusions: The EQUIP programme is a promising treatment, but further research is 
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 An evaluation of the EQUIP treatment programme with men who have 
intellectual or other developmental disabilities.   
Piaget (1932) is often credited as the first to examine the moral development of 
children from a psychological perspective. Kohlberg (1969, 1976) later revised this 
theory and also increased its scope beyond childhood, to adolescence and adulthood.  
While some have criticised Kohlberg (Gilligan, 1982; Krebs & Denton, 2005; 
Schweder, 1982; Sullivan, 1977), others have revised and developed his work into a 
sociomoral stage theory (Gibbs, 1979, 2003, 2010), which has been shown to have 
cross-cultural validity (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007).   *LEEV¶(1979, 
2003, 2010) revised theory comprises four stages, and three transition stages, nested 
within a single phase, which is spread across two levels and labelled Immature and 
Mature (Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 Gibbs (2003, 2010) placed moral reasoning within the context of traditional 
information processing theory, drawing parallels between moral stages and schema.  
He argued that illegal behaviour is driven by delays in moral reasoning, interacting 
with social skills problems and distorted cognitions. This sociomoral reasoning theory 
has been used widely to examine the relationship between such behaviour and moral 
reasoning, and has led to further developments in the theory. Different approaches 
have been adopted, nesting theories of  moral development within the social 
(Semetana, 1999; Turiel, 1983, 2002) or emotional (Eisenberg, Reykowski, & Staub, 
1989; Hoffman, 2000) domains.  However, with some very limited exceptions (such 




as Bolton, 2007), none have been applied to people with intellectual or other 
developmental disabilities.    
 In order to address this shortcoming, Langdon, Clare and Murphy (2010a) 
undertook a structured review of the moral reasoning literature regarding people with 
intellectual and other developmental disabilities.  They noted that many of the studies 
pre-dated more recent theoretical developments, but concluded that the moral 
development of children, adolescents and adults with intellectual disabilities (IDs) 
tends to occur at a slower pace than that of typically developing peers, and these 
differences may be accounted for by their limited cognitive abilities.  However, they 
also suggested that these conclusions must be viewed cautiously because many of the 
studies made use of idiosyncratic and unstandardised assessment methods.     
 As a consequence, Langdon, Clare, Murphy and Palmer (2010b) examined the 
psychometric properties of two measures of moral reasoning abilities amongst men 
with and without IDs who had no known history of illegal behaviour.  They concluded 
that the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992)  
had superior psychometric properties to the Moral Theme Inventory (Narvaez, 
Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999) when used with men with IDs.  They also found 
that men with IDs have moral reasoning abilities that are developmentally immature 
in comparison to men without IDs.   Given the evidence that links immature moral 
reasoning and illegal behaviour (Blasi, 1980; Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; Stams et 
al., 2006), this is of considerable interest. However, the men with IDs who 
participated in the study by Langdon et al. (2010b)  had no known history of illegal 
behaviour.   As a consequence, they interpreted their findings in light of a previous 
paper  (Langdon, Clare, & Murphy, 2011a), arguing that the relationship between 
moral reasoning and illegal behaviour may be moderated by intelligence and therefore 




approximate an inverted U-curve (Figure 1). The implication is that those with IDs 
and no history of illegal behaviour may tend to show developmentally less mature 
moral reasoning, associated with justifications that appeal to unilateral authority and 
avoidance of punishment; therefore as a group, they may demonstrate lower rates of 
illegal behaviour (see Langdon et al., 2011a)   Consistent with this prediction, 
Langdon et al. (2010b) found that men with IDs and no known history of such 
behaviour engaged in moral reasoning about property, law and legal justice in a way 
that was developmentally less mature. In contrast, those without IDs, who also had no 
known history of illegal behaviour, engaged in more mature moral reasoning. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 
Langdon and his colleagues (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Steverson, & Palmer, 
in press) went on to examine the moral reasoning of men with and without IDs who 
had, or did not have, a known history of illegal behaviour leading to one or more 
criminal convictions. Their findings were similar to those of  Langdon et al. (2010b) 
regarding men with IDs with no known criminal history: again, the moral reasoning of 
such men  fell within the less mature stages associated with rule-governed behaviour 
and avoidance of punishment.  However, the moral reasoning of their peers with IDs 
and a history of criminal offending was more mature. Indeed, the moral reasoning of 
offenders with IDs was  actually very like that of young offenders (Blasi, 1980; 
Nelson et al., 1990; Stams et al., 2006).    
Given the similarities between the moral reasoning of men with IDs and a 
history of criminal offending and young offenders, Langdon et al. (2011b) considered 
whether interventions drawing on moral reasoning theory might be effective for those 




with IDs   Interventions for young offenders, grounded in theories of moral 
development, aim to enhance moral reasoning ability as a protective factor.  However, 
when such interventions focus only upon moral reasoning, their impact on behaviour 
is very limited (Arbuthnot & Gordon, 1986; Gibbs, Arnold, Alhborn, & Cheesman, 
1984; Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995; Niles, 1986).  This should not be surprising, 
according to Gibbs and his colleagues (2003, 2010; Gibbs et al., 1995), since moral 
reasoning is a distal factor in illegal behaviour.  
Gibbs (2003, 2010) has argued that behaviour leading to criminal convictions 
among young offenders is associated not only with distal factors,  but also with 
proximal factors, such as distorted cognitions and limited social skills. According to 
Gibbs(2003, 2010), and also Palmer (2003a, 2003b), illegal behaviour is driven by 
cognitive distortions that stem from schema reflecting moral reasoning abilities 
(Gibbs, 2003, 2010). Effective interventions therefore need to target moral reasoning, 
distorted cognitions, and social skills limitations.  A programme designed to enhance 
moral development, tackle distorted cognitions through a process of perspective 
taking, and address social skills limitations has been designed by Gibbs and his 
colleagues (Gibbs, Potter, Barriga, & Liau, 1996; Gibbs et al., 1995; Potter, Gibbs, & 
Goldstein, 2001). The Equipping Youth to Help One Another Programme (EQUIP; 
Gibbs et al., 1996; Gibbs et al., 1995; Potter et al., 2001) has its roots in Aggression 
Replacement Training (Goldstein, Glick, & Gibbs, 1998) in the context of a positive 
peer culture (Vorrath & Brendtro, 1985).  Through anger-management training, the 
programme explicitly targets distorted cognitions, with role play to teach appropriate 
social skills, and facilitated discussion around moral dilemmas to encourage moral 
development.  




There are very few outcome studies evaluating the effectiveness of EQUIP.  
Leeman, Gibbs and Fuller (1993) demonstrated that the programme is effective in 
reducing misconduct and recidivism, and improving social skills amongst young 
offenders.  Others, again working with young offenders, have shown that it is 
effective in reducing cognitive distortions (Brugman & Bink, 2010; Nas, Brugman, & 
Koops, 2005). Unfortunately, however, it seems to have little impact on moral 
reasoning or social skills (Nas et al., 2005) and does not even always reduce 
recidivism (Brugman & Bink, 2010).   In contrast, an intervention study, again with 
young offenders, and using similar techniques to those of EQUIP, namely group 
sessions where moral dilemmas were discussed, reported significant improvements in 
moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1984).   In this study, all the groups included 
participants who demonstrated some developmentally more mature moral reasoning. 
Gibbs and his colleagues (Gibbs et al., 1984) argued that this may have had a crucial 
role in enhancing the moral reasoning of their less developmentally mature peers.   
Given the findings that men with IDs may demonstrate moral reasoning 
similar to that of young offenders, and evidence that EQUIP may have some 
beneficial effects, the aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of an adapted 
version of the EQUIP programme for use with men with intellectual or other 
developmental disabilities.   Using a single case series design, seven men with 
intellectual or other developmental disabilities and a history of illegal behaviour 
leading to criminal convictions  took part in an EQUIP treatment programme over 12 
weeks.  Participants completed pre- and post-treatment measures of moral reasoning, 
problem solving ability, cognitive distortions, and anger.  We hypothesised that 
treatment would lead to an increase in moral reasoning and problem solving abilities, 
and a decrease in distorted cognitions and anger.  






 Seven men (representing 29% of the total patient population within the 
hospital) were recruited from a single NHS medium-secure hospital for men with 
intellectual and other developmental disabilities in the East of England.  The specific 
inclusion criteria were 1) diagnosis of an intellectual disability or other developmental 
disability, and 2) history of illegal behaviour leading to conviction and detention 
within hospital under s.37 of the Mental Health Act (England and Wales) 2003 (as 
amended 2007) for treatment.  Specific exclusion criteria were judgements by the 
SRWHQWLDOSDUWLFLSDQW¶VFOLQLFDOWHDPWKDWKHHLWKHUDODFNHGFDSDFLW\WRconsent to take 
part and/or  2) had an acute mental illness that would impair his ability to take part in 
the group.  With the exception of participant 6, all participants were detained under 
s.41 of the MHA, meaning that they could not be discharged from hospital without the 
approval of the Secretary of State for Justice. Further information about each 
participant is found in Table 2.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Design  
Using a single case series design, assessment measures were completed within 
two to three weeks of the start, and again at the end, of the intervention.     
Measures 
Moral Reasoning.  The Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM-SF) is a 
production measure of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992) and has been shown to 




possess high levels of test-retest reliability (r=0.88; Gibbs et al., 1992), and excellent 
internal consistency Į *LEEVHWDO.  Langdon et al. (2010b) 
demonstrated that the SRM-SF has substantial internal consistency and good test-
retest reliability when used with men with IDs.   The SRM-SF appears valid as it is 
correlated with the Moral Judgement Interview, and discriminates between children of 
differing chronological DJHVDVZHOODVEHWZHHQµGHOLQTXHQW¶DQGµQRQ-GHOLQTXHQW¶
adolescents (Gibbs et al., 1992).   
The SRM-SF comprises eleven questions, and generally takes about twenty 
minutes to present.  The questions relate to the following seven constructs, a) Contract 
(questions one to three), b) Truth (question four), c) Affiliation (questions five and 
six), d) Life (questions seven and eight), e) Property (question nine), f) Law (question 
ten), and g) Legal Justice (question eleven).  Each question is relatively brief, and 
invites the participant initially to consider the importance of behaving in a certain 
manner, or making a certain decision, and choose one of three response options.   For 
H[DPSOHZKHQDVNHGWKHTXHVWLRQ³7KLQNDERXWZKHQ\RX¶YHPDGHDSURPLVHWRD
friend of yours.  How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to their 
IULHQGV"´WKHparticipant is asked to choose whether this is very important, important, 
or not important.   Next, participants are asked to consider their initial response by 
DQVZHULQJWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQ³:K\is that very important / important / not 
LPSRUWDQW"´Participants write their answers on the questionnaire, or provide them 
orally to be recorded by the interviewer.   
Verbatim answers are scored according to a set of complex rules and 
heuristics, and the development of proficient and reliable scoring occurs through the 
use of practice scoring material (Gibbs et al., 1992).  Responses to each question are 
assigned a developmental rating which corresponds to a moral stage associated with 




*LEE¶V6RFLR-Moral Reasoning Theory.  At least seven of the eleven questions must 
be answered with scoreable material in order for a questionnaire to be scored reliably.  
Once a developmental rating is assigned to each question, it is converted to a number 
(e.g. a developmental rating of 1 corresponds to moral Stage 1, and is assigned the 
numerical value 1). Scores across all the questions are then summed and the mean is 
calculated and multiplied by 100, yielding a possible score between 100 to 400.  As 
shown in Table 3WKHVHVFRUHVFRUUHVSRQGWRDSHUVRQ¶VPRUDOVWDJH$GGLWLRQDOO\
moral stage ratings can be generated for the seven constructs examined by the SRM-
SF: a) Contract, b) Truth, c) Affiliation, d) Life, e) Property, f) Law, and g) Justice.  
The scores generated across these constructs are interpreted using Table 3. The inter-
rater reliability of the scoring of the SRM-SF was calculated using a blind rater who 
scored all of the completed questionnaires.  Inter-rater reliability was determined to be 




Insert Table 3 About Here 
 
Cognitive Distortions. The How I Think (HIT) Questionnaire (Barriga, Gibbs, 
Potter, & Liau, 2001) is a measure of cognitive distortions based upon the four-
categories proposed by Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs, 1991, 1993; Gibbs et al., 1995).  
These are: a) Self-Centred, b) Blaming Others, c) Minimizing/Mislabelling, and d) 
Assuming the Worst.  The HIT has 54 items and respondents are asked to indicate 
their degree of agreement along a six-SRLQWVFDOHIURP³DJUHHVWURQJO\´WR³GLVDJUHH




VWURQJO\´7RWDODQGPHDQVFRUHVDUHGHULYHGIRUWKHIRXU-categories of distorted 
thinking as well as four behavioural referent subscales: a) Opposition-Defiance, b) 
Physical Aggression, c) Lying and d) Stealing.  An Anomalous Responding scale is 
also calculated, along with three Summary Scales: a) Overt Scale, b) Covert Scale, 
and c) Total Score.  The Overt Scale is calculated from the Opposition-Defiance and 
Physical Aggression subscales, while the Covert Scale is calculated from the Lying 
and Stealing subscales.  The Total Score is calculated from all subscales.   Barriga et 
al. (2001) reported that confirmatory factor analysis supported the structure of the 
HIT.  Internal consistency of the HIT has been reported to range from 0.63 to 0.96, 
and the measure has been shown to possess convergent, divergent and discriminant 
validity (Barriga et al., 2001).   The measure has been previously used with men who 
have IDs (Langdon et al., 2011b), although there is no reliability and validity data 
regarding the measure when used with this population.  
Problem Solving Ability.   The Problem Solving Task (PST; Rees, 2009) was 
developed specifically for use with people with IDs.  The PST was adapted from a 
similar set of tasks developed for use with sexual offenders with IDs (Nezu, Nezu, 
Good, & Saad, 1998).  The original version has been used as an outcome measure in 
problem-solving training groups (Nezu, Nezu, & Arean, 1991), and contained 
problem situations that were relevant to sexual offenders. Rees (2009)amended the 
situations to include general problems that were more appropriate to people with 
intellectual or other developmental disabilities who may not be offenders.  For 
example, one of tKHILYHYLJQHWWHVUHDGDVIROORZV³<RXERUURZHG\RXUIULHQG¶V&'
EXW\RXDFFLGHQWDOO\EURNHLW<RXZRXOGOLNHWREX\KLPKHUDQHZRQHEXW\RXGRQ¶W
have enough money at the moment. You feel bad because he/she likes the CD and 
asked you to be very carefXOZLWKLW´ 




The PST consists of five problem situations that are read to the participant.  
Participants are then asked a series of questions concerning: a) problem identification, 
b) generation of solutions, c) selection of appropriate solutions, and d) evaluation of 
VROXWLRQV7KHVHVWHSVDUHEDVHGRQWKHPRGHORXWOLQHGE\'¶=XULOODDQG*ROGIULHG
(1971).  Responses to questions are scored according to a set of criteria regarding the 
appropriateness of each response (along a five-point Likert scale).  The mean score 
across each of the four types of questions and the mean total score are calculated for 
each participant.  
Rees (2009) reported that the test-retest reliability of the PST was excellent 
(ri=0.976), as was interrater reliability (ri=0.939).   For the current study, interrater 
reliability was calculated using a blind rater who scored all of the questionnaires.   
Interrater reliability at pre-treatment was ri(7)=0.934 and ri(7)=0.921 at post-treatment 
calculated using intraclass correlations.  
Anger. The Anger Inventory for ³Mentally Retarded´ Persons (AI-MRP; Benson, 
1992) was used to index anger problems within the current study.  The AI-MRP is 
EDVHGRQWKH&KLOGUHQ¶V,QYHQWRU\RI$QJHU(Nelson & Finch, 2000) and is a thirty-
five item instrument that presents situations that may make someone angry.   
Participants are asked to respond to each situation by choosing one of four cartoon 
pictures that indicates how angry they would feel.   Responses to items are summed, 
giving a total score.  Hendrix (1983, cited in Benson & Ivins, 1992) found the test-
retest reliability of the AI-MRP to be 0.62, and factor analysis indicated the measure 
has a single factor solution.   The measure has been used as part of an anger 
managements training programme for adults with IDs (Benson, 1992) and to evaluate 
the outcome of such training (Benson, Rice, & Miranti, 1986).  





Following a favourable ethical opinion from the Cambridge 4 NHS Research 
Ethics Committee, potential participants were approached, after consultation, during 
ward rounds, with the clinical team responsible for their care, and provided with 
written information about the study.  Potential participants who expressed an interest 
in the study met with a researcher who explained it in more detail. Those who then 
wished to take part were then asked to provide written consent. They all had the 
opportunity to have someone else present during this process.  No one was involved 
whose capacity to consent to participate in the research was uncertain.   
Intervention 
The Equipping Youth to Help One Another (EQUIP) Programme.  The 
EQUIP programme (Gibbs et al., 1996; Gibbs et al., 1995; Potter et al., 2001) is a 
manualised treatment programme that was adapted and delivered over 4 sessions per 
week for 12 weeks.  The EQUIP programme is a multicomponent programme 
comprising two types of treatment sessions: a) Mutual Help Meetings, and b) 
Equipment Meetings.   Mutual Help Meetings provide a forum for participants to 
discuss their difficulties within a framework that allows for an appropriate resolution.  
Group members are encouraged to report problems and thinking errors that have 
occurred since the last meeting and one individual is chosen collaboratively by the 
group to discuss his/her problem in greater depth.  The group is provided with a list of 
³12 potential problems´ that they may have or may develop, which is used as a 
reference to aid participantV¶ understanding of their difficulties.  The group then 
works together to actively solve this problem, while paying attention to the type of 
difficulty it is and the thinking errors experienced.   EquLSPHQW0HHWLQJVDUH³DFWLve 




WUHDWPHQW´PHHWLQJVFRPSULVLQJ three different types of sessions: a) anger 
management and thinking error correction, b) social skills training, and c) social 
decision-making training.   There are 30 sessions spread equally across these three 
domains.   Anger management and thinking error correction involves psychoeducation 
about anger, and the teaching of skills to manage anger more effectively, including 
relaxation training.  Cognitive strategies for challenging distorted cognitions are also 
taught.  Social skills training involves the active teaching of skills, using role play and 
other methods, that would be required within a variety of social situations, including 
difficult situations  (e.g. expressing a complaint, keeping out of fights, dealing 
constructively with someone who is angry at you). Finally, social decision-making 
aims to enhance moral development through a process of guided discussion and 
debate about problem situations.   Detailed information about the treatment 
programme can be found in Potter et al. (2001) and Gibbs et al. (1995). 
The treatment programme was delivered over 12 weeks, with four one-hour 
sessions taking place each week.  The first week of four sessions involved orientating 
the group to the Mutual Help Meetings and the Equipment programme.  Each of the 
following ten weeks involved one session of anger management, one session of social 
skills training, and one session of social decision making, followed by one Mutual 
Help Session.  The final week comprised four Mutual Help Sessions.  All sessions 
were led by a clinical psychologist (PL) with support from unit staff and another 
psychologist.  For all sessions, there were three facilitators present.  
Initially, aspects of the EQUIP programme were modified for use with people 
with intellectual or other developmental disabilities.   Homework tasks were 
simplified, although the purpose of these tasks was not changed.  Throughout the 
EQUIP programme, participants were encouraged to make reference to the list of ³12 




potential problems´. The names of some of these problems were considered confusing 
and were therefore modified.  For example, an ³DXWKRULW\SUREOHP´ZDVUH-labelled a 
³KDWHVEHLQJWROGZKDWWRGRSUREOHP´(DFKSUREOHPZDVDFFRPSDQLHGE\DFDUWRRQ
character, and the description of each problem was simplified.  The revised problem 
list and accompanying characters are shown in Table 4.    Participants were also asked 
to make reference to four possible categories of distorted cognitions, or thinking 
errors, throughout the EQUIP programme. These four categories are: a) self-centred, 
b) minimising/mislabelling, c) assuming the worst, and d) blaming others.  Some 
augmentation of the explanation of these thinking errors was required in order to 
improve understanding, and this is found in Table 5.   The material in Table 4 and 
Table 5 was incorporated into posters that were placed in the ward areas within the 
medium-secure service.  Participants and staff were encouraged to use these posters as 
a reference when discussing or dealing with problems outside the treatment groups.   
Insert Table 4 and 5 about here 
 
The social decision making sessions within EQUIP made use of guided 
discussion about a problem situation.  The problem situations provided as part of the 
EQUIP programme required modification because they were more culturally 
appropriate for the U.S.A., and for use with young offenders.   However, the original 
purpose or problem within each situation was retained.  An example of a modified 
problem situation is as follows ³Leon has been in a secure unit for a while and then he 
tried to escape. As a result, all of his leave was cancelled and he was moved to a 
different unit. It took Leon one year to earn the trust of the staff again.  He now thinks 
it is stupid to try to escape.  However, Bob, who is also in the secure unit, tells Leon 




he is planning to escape WKDWQLJKW³,¶YHJRWLWDOOILJXUHGRXW´%REVD\V³,¶OOKLWWKH
VWDIIRQWKHKHDGDQGWDNHWKHLUNH\V´%REDVNV/HRQWRFRPHDORQJ/HRQWULHVWR
talk Bob oXWRILWEXW%REZRQ¶WOLVWHQ´  Following the reading of a problem 
situation, participants were asked a series of questions to guide discussion and 
encourage perspective taking.  
Data Preparation and Analysis 
All data were analysed using SPSS Version 18.0.2.  Scores across all the 
questionnaires for individual participants are reported.  Mean pre- and post-treatment 
scores were calculated across the measures and comparisons across time were made 
using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test.  Exact significance was calculated and is 
reported.  
Results 
Individual participant scores across all of the measures used in this study are 
found in Table 6.  Examination of the moral reasoning scores on the SRM-SF 
revealed that Participants 1 and 4 were reasoning at stage 3 pre-treatment, while the 
remaining participants fell below stage 3; two were reasoning at stage 3(2), two were 
reasoning at stage 2(3) and one was reasoning at stage 2.  All of the participants 
demonstrated moral reasoning below stage 3 in relation to Legal Justice.   Participant 
4 provided a justification that fell at stage 4 for Law, while the remaining participants 
provided justifications that fell below Stage 3.    Table 7 shows that as a group, overall 
pre-treatment moral reasoning scores fell just inside moral stage 3(2). 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 




Post-treatment, scores on the SRM-SF increased for all participants, which is 
in the desired direction.  However, Participants 1 and 5 did not shift a developmental 
stage.  Participants 2 and 3 shifted one stage, to stage 3 and stage 3(2), respectively.  
Participants 4 and 6 shifted two stages, to stage 4(3) and stage 3, respectively, while 
Participant 7 shifted three stages, to stage 3 (Table 4).   Following treatment, there 
was a significant increase in scores on Life (z=1.90, p=0.047), Property (z=2.26, 
p=0.016), Law (z=2.21, p=0.016), Legal Justice (z=2.02, p=0.031) and SRM-SF Total 
Score (z=2.37, p=0.008; Table 7).    
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Looking at distorted cognitions pre-treatment, Participants 3 and 7 had 
Anomalous Responding scores above 4 on the HIT.  Barriga et al. (2001) recommend 
that when participants score higher than 4 on this scale, the findings on the 
questionnaire should be treated cautiously, and when participants score higher than 
4.25, the questionnaire should be discarded.  Participant 3 scored above the 4.25 cut-
off at pre-treatment, while participant 7 scored above this cut-off at post-treatment 
(Table 6).  However, the results were not discarded because it is possible that the 
intellectual or developmental disabilities of these participants accounted, in part, for 
their elevated scores.  Nevertheless, this should be considered when interpreting the 
findings. The remaining subscales on the HIT at pre-treatment were examined for 
each participant.  Comparing the findings with normative data for young people aged 
14 to 19 (Barriga et al., 2001), the results indicated that the scores of Participant 1 fell 
above the lower µERUGHrline-FOLQLFDO¶FXW-off across all subscales, except Stealing.  
Participant 2¶VVFRUHV fell above this cut-off across all subscales, except on Physical 




Aggression and Lying, while Participant 5¶VVFRUHV fell above the cut-off on Blaming 
Others and Lying. Only the scores of Participant 1 and 2 fell above the cut-off for the 
Total Score; those of the remaining participants did not.    
Post-treatment, none of the participantV¶ scores fell above the µERUGHUOLQH-
FOLQLFDO¶FXW-off; lower scores are in the desired direction.  Post-treatment scores were 
significantly lower than pre-treatment scores on the Self-Centred (z=1.86, p=0.031), 
Assuming the Worst (z=2.21, p=0.016), Minimising/Mislabelling (z=1.99, p=0.031), 
Opposition Defiance (z=2.03, p=0.023), Physical Aggression (z=1.78, p=0.047), and 
Lying (z=2.38, p=0.008) subscales.  Post-treatment scores were also significantly 
lower than pre-treatment scores on the Overt (z=2.03, p=0.008), Covert (z=1.86, 
p=0.039) and Total Score (z=1.86, p=0.039) scales (Table 7).  
Finally, turning to problem-solving, ability to choose effective solutions 
improved significantly with treatment (z=2.16, p=0.023), indicating that participants 
were more able to select solutions that were likely to overcome the relevant obstacles, 
achieve the desired goal, and minimise negative consequences (Table 6 and 7). 
 
Discussion 
We hypothesised that, following treatment, participants would show enhanced 
moral reasoning and problem solving, and reduced levels of distorted cognitions and 
anger. The findings indicated that participants¶ moral reasoning, and ability to choose 
solutions that were more likely to overcome the relevant obstacles, achieve the desired 
goal, and result in a minimum of negative consequences, increased.  There was also a 
significant reduction in overall levels of distorted cognitions.  Disappointingly, 




however, overall problem solving ability did not change significantly, and there was 
no significant reduction in anger scores following treatment.    
Other studies have reported that group-based discussion of moral dilemmas 
can bring about developmental increases in moral reasoning abilities (Arbuthnot & 
Gordon, 1986; Fleetwood & Parish, 1976; Gibbs et al., 1984; Rosenkoetter & 
Landman, 1980), but this has not been previously reported for the EQUIP treatment 
programme (Brugman & Bink, 2010; Leeman et al., 1993; Nas et al., 2005).   One 
possible explanation of the discrepancy between our findings relating to moral 
reasoning and those of other studies is the composition of the groups. In contrast with 
our study, other studies have involved young offenders, whose moral development 
may be homogeneous.  Kohlberg (1969, 1976) argued that social perspective-taking 
was necessary for developmental progression through the stages of moral reasoning, 
and Berkowitz, Gibbs and Broughton (1980) commented that developmental shifts 
from more immature levels of moral reasoning to more mature levels are promoted 
when one member of a social pair engages in more mature levels of moral reasoning.  
They demonstrated this experimentally by having two individuals, who were rated at 
different stages of moral reasoning, take part in a discussion.  Following the 
discussion, a notable developmental shift took place in the participant whose moral 
reasoning had initially been less mature.   
In this study, two participants in the EQUIP group were reasoning at ³PDWXUH´
moral reasoning stages prior to treatment, while the remainder demonstrated less 
developmentally mature moral reasoning.  Gibbs et al. (1984) explicitly set out to 
HQVXUHWKDWWUHDWPHQWJURXSVZHUH³KHWHURJHQHRXVZLWKUHVSHFWWRERWKGLOHPPD
GLVFXVVLRQVDQGVRFLRPRUDOVWDJHV´SDQGUHSRUWHGVLJQLILFDQWLQFUHDVHVLQ the 
moral reasoning of young offenders as a consequence of delivering eight sessions of 




group discussion about moral dilemmas.  It appears most likely that our finding that 
scores on the measure of moral reasoning increased post-treatment reflected the 
heterogeneity within the moral reasoning abilities of the participants.  Indeed, 
Langdon et al. (2011a) commented that moral development theory provides a 
theoretical framework that supports the use of group-based interventions in preference 
to individual-based interventions within forensic contexts.  However, the supposed 
superiority of group-based interventions may be affected if there is homogeneity in 
the moral reasoning of the members..   
The findings from this study regarding distorted cognitions are consistent with 
those of  Leeman et al. (1993), Nas et al. (2005) and  Brugman and Bink (2010), who 
all reported distorted cognitions decreased following EQUIP treatment.  However, it 
is worth noting that several of our participants did not appear to have pre-treatment 
difficulties with distorted thinking. It is possible that this reflected their experience of 
similar treatment programmes (e.g. group treatment for sexual offending or fire-
setting) during their detention in hospital.   
7KHILQGLQJWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ability to choose effective solutions to problem 
situations increased after treatment is encouraging.  It is likely that, within the context 
of a larger trial, further effects on problem-solving ability may become evident.  The 
absence of a significant effect on anger scores may be reflect the particular 
characteristics of the participants in the study. None of the seven self-reported 
clinically significant problems with anger, and all of them scored below the mean 
score on the AI-MRP  (97.09 (SD=17.21)), calculated by Benson and Ivins (1992) 
from a sample of 118 people with IDs drawn from the community.  Using these data 
as normative, the pre-treatment mean anger scores of the participants in our study fell 
at the 13th percentile, while the post-treatment mean anger score fell at the 6th 




percentile.  supporting the suggestion that anger was not a major difficulty for the 
participants. 
The overall findings are promising, and are consistent with more recent 
findings from other studies that have attempted to address social problem solving 
amongst offenders with IDs (Lindsay et al., 2010).   However, there are some obvious 
difficulties that require attention.  First, the study used a case series design and as a 
consequence, little can be said about causality.  Although post-treatment moral 
reasoning and the ability to choose problem solutions improved, while distorted 
cognitions decreased, we cannot know whether this change in scores resulted from the 
EQUIP treatment; it is possible that other confounding variables may have had an 
effect.  The only way to address this problem is to undertake a larger study 
incorporating randomisation and appropriate control-groups.    Secondly, some of the 
participants had previously received treatment, such as group-based treatment for their 
sexual offending or fire-setting behaviour. This is a problematic confound that was 
unavoidable within the context of research within a medium-secure hospital.  The 
same difficulty arises in all studies drawing on samples from medium-secure hospitals 
where patients are receiving or have received additional treatments from mental health 
practitioners.   Additionally, in future studies, follow-up data should be collected, as 
this was not possible within the current study.  Finally, it is important to note that the 
three men with Asperger Syndrome, who are likely to have difficulties with social 
perspective-taking, appeared to benefit from this intervention.  This was unexpected, 
but promising, although caution should be exercised when interpreting the findings.    
Despite these shortcomings, the study suggests that the EQUIP programme 
represents a genuinely promising addition to existing psychological therapies 
available within medium- or high-secure hospitals.  There are multiple benefits.  First, 




in contrast to many treatment programmes for people with intellectual or other 
developmental disabilities (e.g. sexual offending programmes; SOTSEC-ID, 2010), 
EQUIP is not offence-specific.  Individuals with differing offence histories can attend 
the same group, helping ensure heterogeneity amongst participants.    Secondly, it is a 
multi-component programme that is theoretically driven and aims to address 
problematic psycho-social difficulties common to many groups of criminal offenders.  
Thirdly, it can be easily modified to meet the needs of those with intellectual or other 
developmental disabilities.  Fourthly, the programme provides a way of socialising 
participants into group-work so that they may go on and participate more effectively 
in programmes that aim to address specific offences, such as sex offending.   
Moreover, the ³12 problems´ and four types of distorted thinking that are the focus of 
EQUIP, and some of the techniques, could easily be included within existing offence-
specific treatment programmes for specific offence types, enhancing continuity 
between treatments.  The implication is that EQUIP may be the first line group-based 
intervention for people with intellectual or other developmental disabilities within 
secure services, with more specialist work following from this initial treatment.  
Fifthly, the programme can be delivered by staff working in secure units, and as a 
consequence, this may encourage generalisation outside the group, while giving those 
providing everyday treatment and support a framework for dealing with difficult 
situations that is linked to treatment.  Finally, EQUIP is meant to lead to the creation 
of a positive-peer culture within organisations, and therefore should have a positive 
effect upon the social climate of a service.  Langdon, Swift and Budd (2006) 
examined the social climate within a medium-secure service for people with 
intellectual disabilities, but to date, no studies have examined how this variable 
explicitly relates to treatment outcome within these services.  In the present study, an 




assessment of social climate was not carried out but we suggest that social climate 
should be included as part of future studies examining the effectiveness of EQUIP in 
secure services.  A positive social climate is likely to have positive effect upon staff 
and participant groups.    
In conclusion, the findings and their implications indicate that a much larger 
controlled trial of EQUIP with people with intellectual or other developmental 
disabilities detained in secure services is justified.  This would allow for appropriate 
investigation of treatment effects and clarification of the benefits for participants and 
services.    
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Level and Stage Description 
Level 1: Immature 
Stage 1: Unilateral and Physicalistic 
 
Moral justifications are based upon unilateral 
authority and rule based, or related to punitive 
consequences of the violation of rules.    
Stage 2: Exchanging and Instrumental Moral justifications based upon an 
understanding that has arisen from social 
interaction with others.   For example, decisions 
to help others may be justified because that 
person may help you in the future.  
Justifications remain superficial. 
Level 2: Mature 
Stage 3: Mutual and Prosocial 
 
Moral justifications are characterised by further 
decentration, and are based upon a prosocial 
understanding of emotional states (e.g. 
empathy), care and good conduct.   
Stage 4: Systemic and Standard 
 
Further maturity is indexed by the development 
of an understanding of the complex social 
structures in which we live.  Justifications are 
also based upon constructs such as rights, 
values and character within society.  Other 
justifications may be based upon social justice 










Participant 1 was 34 years old, with a Full Scale IQ of 77.  He was diagnosed with Asperger 
Syndrome after pleading guilty to manslaughter.  He had previous convictions for violent offences.  
Participant 2 was 28 years old, with a Full Scale IQ of 88. He was diagnosed with Asperger 
Syndrome after being convicted of arson.  He had previous convictions for theft.  
Participant 3 was 21 years old, with a Full Scale IQ of 65.  He had a diagnosis of mild intellectual 
disability and had been convicted of sexual offences involving a child under the age of 13 years.  He 
had previous convictions for theft and sexual offending.  
Participant 4 was 25 years old, with had a Full Scale IQ of 111.  He was a man with a  diagnosis of 
Asperger Syndrome who had pleaded guilty to arson.  
Participant 5 was 30 years old, with had a Full Scale IQ of 65.  He had a diagnosis of mild 
intellectual disability and depression. His had pleaded guilty to arson and had previous convictions 
for assault.  
Participant 6 was 23 years old, with a Full Scale IQ of 69.  He had a mild intellectual disability and 
had been convicted of sexual offences involving children under the age of 13. He had previous 
convictions for theft and assault.  
Participant 7 was 36 years of age, with a Full Scale IQ of 77 and a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome. 
He had pleaded guilty to manslaughter and had previous convictions relating to firearms.  
 
  






The relationship between scores on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure ± Short Form (SRM-
SF) and moral stages.  
Score Moral Stage 
100 to 125 Stage 1 
126 to 149 Transition Stage 1(2) 
150 to 174 Transition Stage 2(1) 
175 to 225  Stage 2 
226 to 249 Transition Stage 2(3) 
250 to 274 Transition Stage 3(2) 
275 to 325 Stage 3 
326 to 349 Transition Stage 3(4) 
350 to 374 Transition Stage 4(3) 
375 to 400 Stage 4 
 




List of augmented problems used within the adapted EQUIP programme 
What problems might you have? 
 
 “>Kt^>&^dD 开 WZK>D 
 
<RXGRQ¶WIHHOYHU\JRRGDERXWyourself 
You think others put you down 
You quit things easily 
You think you are a victim, even when you are hurting others 
 
 “dZ/<^Kd,Z^ 开 WZK>D 
 
You get others to do bad things for you 
<RXJHWRWKHUVWRGR\RXU³GLUW\ZRUN´ 
You manipulate others 
You pretend you had nothing to do with it when others get caught 
and you blame the other person  
 
 “DEdKzKhZ^>& 开 WZK>D 
 
You do things that hurt yourself 
You run away from your problems 
<RXGRQ¶WWKLQN\RXKDYHDQ\SUREOHPV 
 
 “^/>zD/^> 开 WZK>D 
 
You hang around with people who do bad things 
You are willing to go along with friends when they do  
something bad 
You are willing to break the rules or do bad things for others 
because you want them to like you  
 
 “DEdKKd,Z^ 开 WZK>D 
 
You do things that hurt other people 
<RXGRQ¶WFDUHDERXWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJV 
You enjoy making fun of other people, laughing at them, and calling them 
names 
 
 “Zh'E>K,K> 开 WZK>D 
 
You abuse alcohol and drugs 
You are afraid to face life without using drugs or alcohol 
You think that drug and alcohol abuse are not bad  
You blame the drugs or alcohol when you do something wrong  
 
 “,d^/E'dK>t,ddKK 开 WZK>D 
 
You get into arguments with those in authority (like staff, or the police, or 
even a teacher) sometimes over small things 
You hate others telling you what to do 
You hate people giving you advice 
<RXZRQ¶WOLVWHQ 
You sulk and glare or even swear when you are being told to do something 
\RXGRQ¶WZDQWWRGR 
 
 “^d>/E' 开 WZK>D 
 
You take things that belong to other people 
<RXGRQ¶WUHVSHFWRWKHUV 
You are willing to hurt people to take what you want  
 
 “E'Z 开 WZK>D 
 
You get offended too quickly 
You get frustrated or irritated too quickly 
You throw tantrums  
 
 “d>>/E'>/^ 开 WZK>D 
 
You cannot be trusted 
You tell lies and twist the truth 
You tell lies to benefit yourself 
When caught, you deny you told lies 
Sometimes you lie for fun  
 
 “''Zsd^Kd,Z^ 开 WZK>D 
 
You threaten and hassle other people 
You bully other people 
You tease other people 
<RXWU\WR³JHWEDFN´DWRWKHUSHRSOH 
 
 “Whdd/E'KE&ZKEd 开 WZK>D 
 
You try to impress others 
You puff yourself up 
You put on an act 
You clown around to get attention 
You are afraid to show your true feelings 




List of thinking errors and examples used within the augmented EQUIP programme.  
 










































































Sometimes we make ERRORS when we think about situations. 
ERRORS can cause problems.   
 
When you make an ERROR, your BEHAVIOUR might get you into trouble with 
others.  




 Pre- and post-treatment scores across all measures for all participants 
 
  
 Pre-treatment Scores  Post-treatment Scores 
 Participant Number  Particpant Number 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure- Short Form                
Contract (M) 300 300 250 300 317 250 267  333 300 283 367 250 317 317 
Truth 300 250 250 250 250 250 200  350 250 250 350 250 400 250 
 Affliation (M) 275 300 275 325 250 225 200  350 200 275 325 325 275 325 
Life (M) 325 300 225 275 250 250 175  300 300 300 350 300 275 300 
Property 250 200 250 250 150 200 N.S.  300 250 300 400 250 250 250 
Law 250 200 150 400 150 150 150  300 350 250 400 300 250 350 
Legal Justice 250 200 250 250 200 250 200  350 350 200 400 300 250 300 
Total Score 286 255 241 295 250 232 211  318 282 272 364 268 291 305 
Moral Stage 3 3(2) 2(3) 3 3(2) 2(3) 2  3 3 3(2) 4(3) 3(2) 3 3 
How I Think Questionnaire                
Anomalous Responding 2.50 3.00 4.63 3.25 2.38 3.13 4.13  2.88 2.00 2.88 3.00 2.25 3.00 5.75 
Self-Centred 3.33 3.11 1.00 1.78 1.56 1.78 2.11  2.44 1.00 1.44 1.22 1.00 1.89 1.00 
Blaming Others 5.50 2.90 1.50 1.40 3.50 2.00 1.50  2.10 1.00 1.80 1.40 1.00 2.50 1.00 
Minimising Mislabelling 3.44 2.78 1.44 1.78 1.89 1.67 1.00  2.44 1.00 1.11 1.22 1.00 1.89 1.00 
Asssuming the Worst 3.45 2.82 1.64 1.64 1.73 2.36 1.00  2.64 1.00 1.36 1.36 1.55 1.91 1.00 
Opposition-Defiance 4.10 3.10 1.80 1.60 2.00 2.60 1.50  2.70 1.00 2.20 1.40 1.30 1.80 1.00 
Physical Aggression 5.70 2.60 1.00 1.20 2.30 1.80 1.50  2.30 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.00 2.00 1.00 
Lying 3.88  3.00 2.00 2.13 3.38 2.50 1.63  2.88 1.00 1.63 1.25 1.38 1.88 1.00 
Stealing 2.27 2.91 1.00 1.73 1.36 1.18 1.00  1.91 1.00 1.00 1.73 1.36 1.18 1.00 
Overt Scale 4.90 2.85 1.40 1.40 2.15 2.20 1.50  2.50 1.00 1.60 1.25 1.15 1.90 1.00 
Covert Scale 3.07 2.95 1.50 1.93 2.37 1.84 1.31  2.39 1.00 1.31 1.35 1.19 2.16 1.00 
Total Score 3.96 2.90 1.42 1.66 2.21 1.99 1.40  2.43 1.00 1.44 1.30 1.15 2.04 1.00 
Problem Solving Task                
Problem Identification 4.40 3.40 4.20 4.20 3.60 3.80 3.40  3.60 3.80 4.40 4.60 4.20 4.60 4.20 
Generation of Solutions 1.40 1.40 2.60 3.80 1.80 2.40 1.80  2.60 2.20 2.00 2.80 2.20 2.20 1.60 
Solution Selection 3.60 2.60 2.60 3.20 3.00 3.00 3.00  3.40 3.00 3.00 3.60 3.40 3.60 3.20 
Evlauation of Solutions 5.00 4.40 3.20 5.00 4.40 4.80 3.20  4.40 5.00 4.40 4.40 3.80 5.00 2.60 
Total Score 18.00 14.75 15.75 20.25 16.00 17.50 14.25  17.50 17.50 17.25 19.25 17.00 19.25 14.50 
Anger Inventory for Mental Retarded Persons                
Score 91.00 85.00 49.00 63.00 93.00 93.00 72.00  87.00 85.00 44.00 72.00 75.00 78.00 65.00 
N.S. Not Scorable      




Mean (SD) scores at pre- and post-treatment across all measures.  
 
 
 Pre-treatment  Post-treatment  
 M (SD) M (SD) 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure- Short Form   
Contract (M) 283.43 (27.25) 309.52 (37.09) 
Truth 250.00 (28.89) 300.00 (64.55) 
 Affliation (M) 264.29 (43.96) 296.43 (50.89) 
Life (M) 253.57 (56.70) 303.57* (22.49) 
Property 216.67 (40.83) 285.71* (55.64) 
Law 207.14 (93.22) 314.29* (55.64) 
Legal Justice 228.57 (26.73) 307.14* (67.26) 
Total Score 252.86 (26.73) 300.00** (33.32) 
How I Think Questionnaire   
Anomalous Responding 3.29 (0.82) 3.12 (1.22) 
Self-Centred 2.10 (0.84) 1.43* (0.55) 
Blaming Others 2.61 (1.50) 1.54 (0.61) 
Minimising Mislabelling 2.00 (0.83) 1.38* (0.57) 
Asssuming the Worst 2.09 (0.84) 1.55* (0.57) 
Opposition-Defiance 2.39 (0.95) 1.63* (0.64) 
Physical Aggression 2.30 (1.60) 1.34* (0.56) 
Lying 2.64 (0.81) 1.57** (0.66) 
Stealing 1.64 (0.72) 1.40 (0.58) 
Overt Scale 2.34 (1.24) 1.49 *(0.56) 
Covert Scale 2.14 (0.69) 1.49 *(0.56) 
Total Score 2.22 (0.93) 1.48 *(0.55) 
Problem Solving Task   
Problem Identification 3.86 (0.41) 4.20 (0.38) 
Generation of Solutions 2.17 (0.85) 2.23 (0.39) 
Solution Selection 3.00 (0.35) 3.31* (0.25) 
Evlauation of Solutions 4.29 (0.78) 4.23 (0.82) 
Total Score 16.64 (2.09) 17.46 (1.60) 
Anger Inventory for Mental Retarded Persons   
Score 78.00 (17.18) 72.29 (14.55) 
  *p<0.05 
**p<0.001 
***p<0.0001 
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